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A widely held belief in financial economics suggests that stock prices always 
adequately reflect all available information. Price movements away from funda-
mentals are assumed to occur only infrequently, if at all. „False“ prices are sup-
posed to be corrected by the counter-actions of „rational“ investors reestablishing 
equilibrium. However, empirical evidence of widespread irrationality among in-
vestors as well as theoretical insights into the properties of complex systems sug-
gest that this view is too static. In fact, it can be shown that under certain condi-
tions dynamic disequilibria have a considerable probability of being „locked in“. 
The mass media play no mean role in this: By conditioning trend-following be-
havior and fostering coordination among large numbers of investors, the media 
can help bring about such destabilizing moves. Media attention can induce posi-
tive feedback by increasing the level of excess noise in the market while decreas-
ing the number of perceived behavioral options. Meta-communication thus gen-
erated is a prime source of instability in financial markets.  






Meta-Communication and Market Dynamics. 





A sensation seems to be in the making. “Within a year, if all goes well, the 
first cancer patient will be injected with two new drugs that can eradicate any 
type of cancer, with no obvious side effects and no drug resistance – in mice.”
1 
This breathtaking news is reported by the New York Times on the front page of 
its Sunday issue. Renowned cancer experts, among them a Nobel Prize Laure-
ate, are said to be "electrified" by the results. Whereas existing drugs were on-
ly able to slow down growth, the new substances are said to lead to the com-
plete eradication of tumours. The company that holds the licence for the active 
substances is mentioned as well: Entremed. The stock price of the small bio-
technology company reacts immediately. It increases by 600 per cent. 
The news is spectacular and exciting. But it is not new. The New York 
Times itself had reported about the new therapy of tumours in animals in an 
article half a year earlier.
2 The first text already contains all ingredients of the 
sensational cover story: the ground-breaking research result; enthusiastic com-
ments from experts; and the name of the licensee: Entremed. CNN and CNBC 
also cover the story. These reports are based on research results published in 
Nature magazine - the original source about the successful elimination of ma-
lignant melanomes in mice.
3 In brief: The information which is presented in 
the spectacular Times cover story half a year later is, strictly speaking, old hat. 
All the more surprising is the sudden and immense increase of the Entre-
med stock. 600 per cent. The New York Times is obviously surprised about the 
effect of its own coverage and nervously backs out.
4 Financial economists are 
amazed by the stock price reaction to the non-event as well.
5 For, economi-
cally speaking, the cover story is news without an information content: The 
facts have long been known to the market. According to the efficient market  




hypothesis, which says that all available information is always completely re-
flected in prices, the re-publication of the story should not have provoked any 
significant price reactions. Journalistic re-runs should remain ineffective. 
But what happens in this case is exactly the opposite. The Entremed stock 
reacts twice: To the publication of the original news. And, much more vio-
lently, to the prominently placed re-run of the research report on the Times 
cover. 600 per cent, one of the biggest price gains ever. But it is not just that: 
The stocks of a number of other biotechnology companies are infected by the 
euphoria and experience strong price increases as well – although nothing new 
is published about them at the time.
6 The stocks of a whole branch of industry 
rise, as it seems, because some newspaper journalists have re-packaged alrea-
dy known research results a second time. 
 
1. Introduction 
Conventional financial market research assumes that price movements away 
from fundamental values are rather rare and, if they occur, that they are often 
quickly corrected. Stock prices thus always adequately reflect all available in-
formation. According to this model, the mass media do not play a substantial 
role in price formation. Rather, they are important as a transmission channel in 
which news is passed on to market participants as quickly as possible. In fact, 
this approach sees the mass media as a factor which contributes to the increa-
se of market efficiency: By providing information relevant for stock prices 
more and more quickly for a continously broadening audience, they accelerate 
the process of finding the “correct price”. 
In order for this to happen, one prerequisite is indispensable: Information 
that the media offers about the real economic situation has to be as accurate as 
possible. This means that the contribution of the mass media to market effi-
ciency decisively depends on the question whether they can paint, naively 
speaking, an “undistorted” picture of economic activity. If they cannot, it is 
very well conceivable that media impact leads to unusual effects which are in 
no way related to fundamental values. However, the findings of communica-
tion research are legion which show that the media may play a lot of different 
roles, but definitely not this one: the role of providers of reality “as it is”. Thus,  




as long as the media are ignored as an autonomous factor which conditions 
market reactions, a decisive piece of a very complex puzzle is left out. 
The media structure contents by selecting and evaluating; the weighting of 
information in the media, however, never corresponds to the distribution of in-
formation in reality. The media produce explanations by establishing logical 
links and causal relations; these interpretations, though, are only more or less 
adequate to reality. The media enrich information by adding new elements 
such as “emotion” or “suspense”; through this process, however, the character 
of the information is altered. The media can even create their own events whe-
re nothing would happen otherwise – or they can encourage others to do so. In 
short: The media select, they interpret, they emotionalize and they create 
facts. 
As generators of attention, the media are prone to condition selective aware-
ness: The media not only reduce reality by lowering information density. They 
focus reality by accumulating information where “actually” none exists. The 
goal behind this is to win public attention, to control it and to keep it as long as 
possible. Ideally (from the point of view of the media), feedback loops are ge-
nerated in which selected events increase attention, which, on the other hand, 
serves as a proof for the importance of the news, whose visibility then is in-
creased even further. These mechanisms cannot only be found in the enter-
tainment sector; they can also be encountered in the information media, the 
general news media, as well as in the business media.  
One thing is for certain, and that is that the media are far from being the 
neutral transmitters of news, as suggested in the abstract world of efficient 
markets. The news stream of the mass media definitely does not follow a ran-
dom pattern. This does not necessarily and systematically lead to non-random 
prices: As empirical evidence of the effects of news on stock prices demon-
strates, price reactions triggered by media reports are nothing unusual, but 
most of the time, they do not occur systematically. In principle, however, 
there is the possibility that the media, due to their function of generating selec-
tive awareness and selective behavior, induce and reinforce specific market 
reactions which develop into dynamic interactions afterwards.  




In the following, the results of psychological studies, results of empirical 
media research, and of empirical financial economics as well as recent theo-
retical work on complex systems are consulted in order to gain an insight into 
the dynamics of markets under growing media presence. The underlying idea 
is that financial markets are dynamic systems whose behavior can change in 
interaction with environmental conditions and due to internal mechanisms, 
and which thus do not permanently show the same stable processes. Our as-
sumption is that the interpenetration of markets and the media has brought 
about major changes. The following questions are to be settled: Do dynamic 
interactions between markets and the media exist? And if yes, which? 
 
2. Feedback: The Media as “Learning-Lab” 
One precondition for the emergence of systematic price movements is the es-
tablishment of feedback between stock prices and investors: Investment deci-
sions in this case are not orientated to fundamentals, but to price developments 
in the past. If the media functioned as a link supporting such processes, con-
siderable dynamic interactions would be conceivable. Shiller (2002) argues 
that it is possibly feedback processes that underlie many of the daily price fluc-
tuations which are so difficult to explain.
7 In the short, medium or long term, 
on a smaller as well as on a larger scale, according to Shiller, feedback does 
not seem to be unusual in speculative markets. 
Do the media have the potential to generate such a feedback? The results of 
media effects research clearly indicate it. Nobody disputes that the media mark 
out the limits of discourse and influence patterns of perception by setting the 
public agenda. The news, especially television news, define the thematic 
grounds on which the majority of the audience moves.
8 Media accounts thus 
have an immediate influence on the relative attention which individual topics 
gain in the public awareness. By emphasizing certain contents and suppressing 
others, the media do not only have an impact on what preoccupies people’s 
minds, but also on how they judge these things.
9 The manner how news pre-
sent the world rubs off on the perceptions of the audience. 
Such consequences of the consumption of media constructions of reality 
can be measured in spot checks. Cumulatively, they condense into patterns of  




perception which are strongly conditioned by media representations: Regular 
media consumption can have the effect of cultivating attitudes and opinions 
which come closer and closer to the media version of reality.
10 These percep-
tions, on the other hand, can constitute the basis for future patterns of behav-
ior. Conditioning the perceptions of large numbers of individuals could thus 
cumulatively generate a kind of homogenous mass behavior.
11 The overrepre-
sentation of certain media contents increases the probability of behavioral dis-
positions condensing into certain patterns. In a word: The mass media are a 
motor of social feedback. Potentially a very strong one. 
There are more and more theoretical, experimental and empirical findings 
indicating feedback induced by the media in the financial markets: Merton 
(1987) demands that the “evolution of institutions and information technolo-
gies” be taken into account in order to adequately describe the long-term dy-
namics of the financial markets.
12 For an investor could only buy a stock if he 
knew it. But the attention of investors is not distributed equally across the 
market. The media therefore play a key role: „A newspaper or other mass me-
dia story about the firm or its industry”, Merton says, “that reaches a large 
number of investors who are not currently shareholders, could induce some of 
this number to incur the set-up costs and follow the firm.”
13 In brief: The me-
dia draw potential investors into the market. 
Merton makes the attempt to explain the changes in market dynamics 
within the framework of conventional models of rational investor behavior. 
For this purpose, however, he starts from the – hardly realistic – assumption 
that media accounts of companies and industries are always caused by chan-
ges in fundamental factors. He is wise to point out that the expansion of the 
influence of mass media specifically supports models of irrational investor be-
havior. “In such models”, according to Merton, “media coverage, public rela-
tions and other forms of investment marketing could play an important causal 
role in creating and sustaining speculative bubbles and fads among inves-
tors.”
14 
Psychological studies examined how such speculative dynamics can be ge-
nerated. Experiments carried out by Andreassen and Kraus (1988) indicate 
that test persons in simulated stock markets tend to extrapolate trends from 
past price changes if they believe to have noticed them.
15 Andreassen (1990)  




provides evidence for the fact that business news do have a corresponding in-
fluence on investor behavior in real markets: More importance is attached to 
current information in comparison to more dated information. The specific 
way of presenting news, for example emphasizing them through techniques of 
dramatizing or emotionalizing, seems to activate decision-making rules which 
bring about a preference for this information.
16     
More recent empirical findings by Barber and Odean (2002) complement 
these psychological results. They show that stock selection on the part of in-
vestors takes place in a structured way: Stocks which generate special atten-
tion, due to high turnovers, strong price fluctuations or media coverage, are 
given priority. The decision-making problem, to choose a single stock from an 
immense number of existing company values, is solved by simple heuristics: 
Investors buy stocks which stand out. Barber and Odean come to the conclu-
sion: “Just as publicity may help firms to sell their goods to the public, it may 
also help them to sell their stock.”
17 In short: There is hardly any doubt that 
the media structure the decision-making process of many market partici-
pants.
18 
But structure in which way? Andreassen points out that the news media in 
general tend to provide explanations which are in accord with the reported 
events: “[…] the media must focus on prominent recent changes. To then ex-
plain why these changes have occurred, the media must search for information 
consistent with these changes, and selectively present favorable information 
about the company after positive price movements and unfavorable informa-
tion after negative price movements. Such reports would be expected to in-
crease the salience of the price change information by increasing the extent to 
which investors believe that the price changes are meaningful, important, and 
systematically different from zero.”
19 
A typical stock market report looks like this: Stock X increased because... 
Index Y crashed due to... Prices Z continue to rise after... Most of these expla-
nations are post-hoc rationalizations. Correlations which do not really exist are 
established. Reasons are constructed which can be interchanged arbitrarily. 
The explanations, as it seems, are quite obvious, even if they are far-fetched. 
In a nutshell: An artificial logic is created, based on a simplistic understanding 
of the markets, which implies: that there are simple explanations for most  




price movements; that price movements follow rules which then lead to sys-
tematic patterns; and of course: that the news disseminated by the media deci-
sively contribute to the emergence of price movements. 
Andreassen (1987) demonstrates which effects explanations for stock mar-
ket movements usually provided by the media have on investors’ behavior: In 
the light of the explanations in media coverage, current price changes do not 
appear as temporary random products, but rather as the results of trends. The 
media thus shift investors’ attention and motivate them to extrapolate the price 
movement and to follow the trend. In absence of such a media stimulus, ac-
cording to Andreassen, this reaction fails to materialize. This permits the as-
sumption that with larger parts of the public getting into the reach of the busi-
ness media, the number of feedback-traders, that means of investors who fol-
low a homogenizing impulse, continues to increase. 
20  
The random character of price movements and their complexity is no ade-
quate subject for news. They are “explained away” in the media until a picture 
of the markets emerges which systematically deviates from real market proc-
esses. The media thus structure the decision-making horizon of the market 
participants following them: by foccussing the audience’s attention through 
selectivity and publicity; and by underlying random processes with a logic 
which gives the impression of trends (but which in fact follows the rules of 
journalistic strategies of presentation). It is highly probable that this kind of 
coverage reinforces the latent tendency of investors to see trends where there 
are none. And to behave accordingly. 
Shiller (2000) considers that the relationship of markets and the media is a 
very complex one: “News stories rarely have a simple, predictable effect on 
the market.”
21 In many ways, Shiller says, media effects are even overestima-
ted. But the media can set the basis for certain market movements and provide 
their triggers. According to Shiller, “cascade effects” can be generated by at-
tention which generates even more attention: The news present price changes 
and reinforce their “actual” weight by cumulating attention. This again leads 
to increased attention and potentially stronger price movements – a feedback 
mechanism which can provoke extreme price movements.  




The bottom line is that growing media influence seems to create the condi-
tions for an increasingly strong herd instinct among market participants. Hirsh-
leifer and Teoh (2003) point out that under certain circumstances, a homo-
genization of the decisions of many investors is observable. By watching the 
behavior of other investors and imitating it afterwards, chain reactions can be 
set off among market participants. According to the authors, imitating role 
models present in the media plays a role as well. The infection with emotions 
such as panic or euphoria also is a common phenomenon in practice. As a 
huge “learning lab”, the mass media are predestined to encourage such accu-
mulations of behavior.     
 
3. News Structures: “Use Value” and “Narrative Imparative”      
The media follow the laws of competitive publicity – including the business 
media: Use value and sound information are announced. In reality, however, 
the tools of the attention industry are being applied: What is offered is sus-
pense and action, stars and starlets, hopes and dreams, phantasies of redemp-
tion. And promises: Simple recipes for accumulating great wealth are boom-
ing. Behind the surface structure of the announced information, there are deep 
structures which evoke affective reactions among the audience. In times of 
fierce competition, the media are eager to increase customer loyalty by estab-
lishing an emotional feedback in order to gain competitive advantages.
22 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2002) develop a model which indicates what 
kind of media deep structures these could be. It turns out that under the condi-
tions of a competitive system, an ideological orientation of the media is not 
only not a problem, but it is even desirable: If the positions of various media 
compete, these differing perspectives result in a broader picture. What is dif-
ferent, however, is the effect of what the authors call “spin”: the deliberate at-
tempt to make news as conspicious as possible in order to catch the audience’s 
attention. The goal of the media to outdo each other, the authors say, has the 
effect that the stories reinforce each other – and thus continuously narrow the 
perspective. The keener the competition between the media, the more pro-
nounced the homogenization and exaggeration of the contents.
23  




The competition between the media – and this includes the business media 
– turns into a fight for public attention. Or, as the media theorist Georg Franck 
remarks: “It is like being in a beer tent. If everybody speaks loudly, you have 
to shout in order to make yourself heard.”
24 Growing competition induces the 
press to produce a massive amount of headlines to sell more copies. A rather 
strident tone prevails on TV, sometimes verging on hysteria. This overstimu-
lation tends to reinforce itself, permanent mutual excitement becomes the pre-
dominant principle of communication. The stimulation of the public replaces 
the simulation of reality as a guiding principle of a lot of media.
25     
The consequences can be felt in the choice of contents as well as in the sty-
le of their presentation: The new business media concentrate on bringing out 
the “action” of the financial markets. No matter whether investors buy or sell, 
permanent price fluctuations are the focus of attention. The markets are pre-
sented as a game of chance or a ride on the roller-coaster. Charts show the 
price movements of the past which are interpreted as trends. Stock recom-
mendations and stock price forecasts are intended to help interpret the future 
and to make profitable investment decisions. “News to use” is the motto of 
this novel kind of business coverage. The relevance of the news is derived 
from the implied utility.
26 
  The aesthetics of presentation follow the logic of the competition for atten-
tion as well: The make-up of many business magazines is consciously de-
signed to trigger an emotional reaction. Even news television increasingly 
tends to follow the path of emotionalizing. Presenting affectively charged ma-
terial, bringing out the human interest components, highlighting the personal-
ity aspect – the rivalry between the media favors a climate in which the exag-
geration of contents and the calculation of effects are pursued systematically. 
As a result, this leads to a permanent balancing act between the promise of 
trustworthiness and the temptation of effect.
27 
What differentiates the business media from one another is the presentation 
and the design – sensationalism, storytelling, superlatives – rather than their 
ideological profile. Both liberal and conservative media operate within the 
same discursive limits: a market ideology which considers the liberalization of 
the financial system as inevitable and desirable and the involvement of larger 
and larger shares of the population in the stock market as a sign of progress.
28  




The central question of the business media is when to invest and how much. 
And not, if at all. A relativization of this macro-story from an ideological per-
spective does not take place. 
It is not only in times of an economic boom that the tone of many business 
media is characterized by permanent optimism. There are economic reasons 
for this as well: The business media depend on a positive market environment. 
Particularly the success of publications oriented towards the capital market 
strongly correlates with market sentiments. In rising markets, circulation and 
ratings rise, in falling markets, they fall.
29 Therefore positive scenarios of the 
future are desirable. Pessimistic prognoses are not seen fit to achieve this goal. 
This is obvious when looking at the ratio of buy and sell recommendations: 
Very rarely, articles recommend to sell investment securities. The large major-
ity of stock evaluations are buy recommendations.
30  
"There was enormous pressure to report positively about what was going 
on at the stock market", a journalist of a financial magazine admitted during 
the stock market boom.
31 And even during the downturn, the coverage high-
lighted the positive aspects.
32 An explanation could be: The more people feel 
attracted by the markets, the higher the profits of financial service providers. 
As a consequence, their budgets for advertisements in the business media 
grow. One central aspect, however, is thus neglected: The risks of the stock 
markets are ignored. In many media reports, authors overlook that the chances 
to obtain the expected yield are bought by taking serious risks.
33 This certainly 
does not contribute to an increased risk awareness among  investors. 
James Surowiecki (2001), author for the New Yorker magazine, describes 
the changes in market dynamics in times of omnipresent business coverage: 
„A market is best at setting prices when the people in it make their decisions 
on their own. Its collective wisdom arises out of the cumulative effect of mil-
lions of independent decisions. You don’t get that wisdom in a world domi-
nated by CNBC-style coverage. In that world, every decision becomes depen-
dent. And, in certain circumstances […] you end up with a mob instead of a 
market.”
34 
Similarly, Bernstein (2001) is critical of the expected benefit of the swell-
ing stream of information: “Some television stations now post reporters on  




trading floors at exchanges, and they report investment information measured 
in minutes. Such reporting is very similar to the poor reporters who must give 
hurricane reports from the waterfront. […] In both cases, the reporters tend to 
report eye-catching but probably worthless information. Yes, there are high 
winds and strong surf during a hurricane. Yes, stock trading becomes more 
frantic when unexpected news is announced.”
35 Moreover, Bernstein points 
out that a lot of economic news events are pseudo-events. Many of the seem-
ingly surprising positive company news, for example, were carefully enginee-
red beforehand. 
Robert Shillers (2000) observations on the coverage during the stock mar-
ket boom point in the same direction: “Many news stories in fact seem to have 
been written under a deadline to produce something – anything – to go along 
with the numbers from the market. […] Sometimes the article is so completely 
devoid of genuine thought about the reasons for the bull market and the con-
text for considering its outlook that it is hard to believe that the writer was 
other than cynical in his or her approach.”
36 There are thus many signs indicat-
ing that the news structures of business coverage are not very beneficial to ra-
tional, critical, sensible, differentiated and diversified investor behavior. 
 
4. Media Manias: The “CNBC-Effect” 
The structure of news contents would be of limited interest if is was not trans-
ferred to the behavior of investors. But the opposite is true: The media do have 
the potential to provoke market moves. As the following example illustrates: 
On Friday, 30 June 2000, the stocks of MACC Private Equities, a small in-
vestment company, suddenly rise by 80 per cent. The trading volume of the 
stock comes to 300 per cent of the usual level. Apparently, what is behind all 
this is a mistake of the TV channel CNBC: Shortly before, CNBC had brought 
a positive report about Applied Micro Circuits, a semi-conductor manufactu-
rer, with an insertion of its ticker symbol – which is AMCC. However, what 
appeared on the screen was MACC. The employees of the finance channel had 
transposed two letters of the ticker symbol.
37 
Nowhere else are autonomous media effects more obvious that in case of 
fictitious news which do not have any real economic content at all. For exam- 




ple in case of manipulations of information in order to influence and deceive 
market participants: Price swings after the deliberate publication of false in-
formation show that news per se can be followed by substantial price move-
ments, which are not immediately corrected by the market. In such cases of 
“invented” information, it turns out that investor reactions occur in the finan-
cial markets which represent a mere function of media publicity. A price reac-
tion to the substance of the news is not possible, for there is no such substance. 
A well-known example is the case of Emulex: The stock of the Californian 
maker of network products was under strong selling pressure after a fake re-
port with a negative content had circulated on the internet: It claimed that the 
CEO had resigned and that the company would soon publish a profit revision. 
The stock price fell by more than 50 per cent in only a few minutes, a decrease 
in the market capitalization of about two billion Dollars. In other words: The 
fake piece of news, which had been disseminated with the intention to mani-
pulate, had a strong effect on the stock price of the company concerned – al-
though (or perhaps even because) it was fundamentally fictitious. The law en-
forcement authorities were convinced by the impact of the false report: When 
the author was identified, he was sentenced to serve a long imprisonment.
38 
In another case, a swindler managed to make stock prices of a company 
soar by publishing a false report. The stocks of Pairgain Technologies had 
steadily lost in market value before one day, the price suddenly rocketed. For 
a short period of time, the stock rose from 8,50 to more than 11 Dollars, a 
temporary increase in value of more than 30 per cent.
39 In the market, rumors 
had circulated that Pairgain was to be taken over for twice as much as its ac-
tual market value. Little later, it turned out that the story was completely ficti-
tious and had been disseminated through an internet message board. In this 
case, the courts were convinced of the effect of the false information as well. 
After his arrest, the perpetrator was sentenced to pay a high fine.
40  
Media effects can not always be isolated in such an accurate way. For ex-
ample, the average price movements following stock recommendations, which 
can also be considered media non-events, are often much less pronounced 
than in case of the described manipulation of information. Nevertheless, the 
publicity effect proves that market participants are prompted by the recom-
mendations of stock market commentators to buy stocks. Temporary signifi- 




cant price increases and an often strong increase in trading volume of the 
stocks commented on are the result. The tips disseminated by the media gen-
erate a temporary pricing pressure because certain investors reach for the rec-
ommended stocks. Since most of these price reactions are not sustained, it is 
fair to assume that it is not the information content of the news that plays the 
decisive role, but rather autonomous media effects.     
With the expansion of the media system, particularly the spread of televi-
sion providers specializing in business topics, such media effects should have 
reached a new dimension. Busse and Green (2001) state that news about ana-
lysts’ reports broadcast on CNBC can evoke significant price reactions. Obvi-
ously, television viewers carry out transactions on the basis of these reports: 
The trading volume of the stocks mentioned on TV doubles in the first min-
utes after the program. Significant trading gains also seem possible – if people 
act very rapidly: The effect subsides after 15 seconds. Investors who hesitate 
longer have to expect a loss, because a partial price reversal sets in, which is 
an indicator of an overreaction.
41 
While Busse’s and Green’s sample seems to show a mixture of the infor-
mation and the publicity effect, Meschke (2002) hardly finds any traces of a 
genuine information content in the interviews with company managers, broad-
cast regularly on CNBC: The interviews with the CEOs are non-events, since 
no news are published which would not have been known to the market be-
fore. But these non-events do not remain without consequences: The attention 
generated in the television programs results in a short-term increase in prices 
and a sharply increased trading activity of the stocks concerned. Meschke 
finds average excess returns of 1,65 per cent on the event day with trading vo-
lumes being 169 per cent above the norm.        
But the price gains do not last long. The price increase is followed by a 
loss: Within ten days after the interviews, prices go down by 2.78 per cent on 
average, i.e. below the level of the event day. Meschke draws the following 
conclusion: “The presence of the CEOs on CNBC generates a temporary pres-
sure to buy through enthusiastic investors.”
42 To put it differently: Rationally 
deliberating agents of the model of efficient markets are not at work here, but 
rather so-called noise-traders: Investors who react to information which does 
not exist. This means that under certain circumstances, substantial reactions of  




large numbers of market participants seem to appear which cannot be ex-
plained by the content of new information. 
Following an old saying by McLuhan, the medium actually seems to be the 
message in case of these reactions. These occurences are very meaningful for 
understanding the dynamics of markets and the media since they are a matter 
of price movements which are causally related to the mass media – and there-
fore demonstrate an autonomous role of the media. However, it would be an 
oversimplification to be satisfied with the attempt to isolate such manifest 
short-term media effects: Firstly, these effects mostly occur sporadically, 
which makes it difficult to deduce any general statements about “laws” with-
out overcharging them with auxiliary hypotheses.
43 Secondly, the complex 
systemic interactions between markets and the media would not even be con-
sidered when concentrating on isolated effects. 
 
5. Meta-Communication: Media-induced Dynamic Interactions 
Are overreactions to media reports solely the result of rash reactions of naive 
traders who are under a misapprehension and follow vacuous information? Or 
is there a change in market dynamics? The evidence suggests the latter. Dy-
namic price trends are elicited by different types of investors who interact 
with one another: growing numbers of noise traders, whose attention is drawn 
to the markets by the media, and who act on the basis of “used” news; and 
growing numbers of momentum traders who act reflectively and try to make a 
profit from the price movements generated by the noise traders. This would 
explain the observation of Fischer Black (1986) that rational and irrational tra-
ders are often difficult to distinguish.
44 
Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that the demand pattern of investors 
who follow pseudo-information such as stock recommendations, is hardly ra-
tional.
45 They say that noise traders are often subject to homogenous group 
behavior, which could have the effect that they gain a significant influence on 
the aggregate level. Despite their “actually” incorrect behavior, they could be 
successful temporarily as a group. This, on the other hand, brings imitators on 
to the scene and further increases their influence in the market.
46 The price 
movements thus provoked, the authors say, are not always corrected by ra- 




tional investors (arbitrageurs): either because price fluctuations elicited by ir-
rational traders increase the risk too much and prevent counter-action; or be-
cause it pays off to swim with the tide and to intensify price dynamics.
47 
If rational investors follow the latter strategy, it is temporarily impossible to 
distinguish between noise traders and “information holders” because they be-
have identically. In fact, it is conceivable that a kind of “professionalization” 
takes place even among noise traders, in the sense that they learn with time 
that they do not possess any real information and focus exclusively on antici-
pating the reactions of the bulk of their colleagues. The “rational” momentum 
traders do not behave differently anyway. The prerequisites for a reflexive be-
havior of investors, which ignores fundamentals and is oriented at the behav-
ior of others, is enormously reinforced by the feedback mechanism of the me-
dia.
48 From this point of view, the media have, above all, one function: They 
are a device which facilitates strategically calculated coordination. 
This kind of self-reflexiveness can have various reasons: the tendency, sup-
ported by the media, to extrapolate trends; the gradual realization on the part 
of the noise traders that the information available to them has already been 
used at the time of the publication; but also the increasing self-reference of the 
journalists: Self-referentiality has become firmly established in the media as a 
strategic ritual. Similar to the stock market gurus, who warn of other gurus, the 
media increasingly comment on current developments with reference to or 
even warnings of the coverage of other media. The participation of the journa-
lists in the generation of many events is often explicitly pointed out.
49 
Choosing themselves as theme for the media has the primary function of 
immunizing themselves against criticism of their view of reality. This choice 
makes it possible to simulate a distance from the things they report about. 
Among internet commentators in particular, this kind of pseudo-enlightenment 
has become very popular: The greatest “noise critics” are also the greatest 
“noise makers”.
50 One cannot rule out the possibility that this builds up a criti-
cal attitude towards the news among the audience. Without doubt, the media-
induced artificial character of the coverage comes to the fore – a possible pre-
condition of a self-reflexive behavior on the part of the market participants, 
which we shall call meta-communication in this context. 
Morris and Shin (2001) also suppose that the growing influence of the 
media results in a strategically calculated behavior of the market partici- 




pants, which takes media effects into account – with potentially dangerous 
consequences: “The very fact that the news reaches a large audience also tells 
the recipient that many others have also just learned this piece of news.”
51 Ac-
cording to the authors, this could lead to an anticipating kind of behavior 
which is not geared to economic factors, but to the expected reactions of other 
investors. By trying to beat their competitors, investors provoke the antici-
pated reactions – and reinforce them. This can then lead to considerable over-
reactions. 
Under such circumstances, it is not necessarily irrational from the point of 
view of individual market participants to chase after excessive prices: If one 
assumes that rising prises produce positive news, and that these tend to favor 
rising prices in return, it is not unreasonable to predict a continuation of such a 
trend. The whole world is watching and knows that the whole world is watch-
ing. What results from this logic is a noticeable homogenization of investor 
behavior. The noise disseminated by the media leads to repeated overreactions 
among investors, which can increase the noise in return and thus evoke further 
overreactions. One consequence could be the formation of price bubbles and 
finally crashes. All in all, the partly rational behavior of individual investors 
generates an irrational collective result.
52  
From the point of view of game theory, this process can be characterized as 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Joshi, Parker and Bedau (1998) show that technical 
strategies (i.e. trend following methods) have a competitive advantage over 
fundamental strategies: Technical strategies dominate, no matter which me-
thod or strategy of analysis the other market participants pursue. From an in-
dividual perspective, it would therefore be rational to integrate a technical 
component, which possibly has the effect that in subsequent “rounds of the 
game”, technical strategies are preferred in the selection.
53 As soon as the ma-
jority of market participants relies on technical strategies, however, the result 
for every single actor deteriorates. As soon as it is pursued by the group, the 
individually rational behavior collectively produces a suboptimal result.
54 
The explanation for this seemingly paradoxical finding is the following: 
The more traders extrapolate trends, the more frequently positive feedback 
and self-fulfilling prophecies occur. If more and more actors follow a trend, 
noise and price bubbles are the consequence. Volatility increases, which makes  




it increasingly difficult to give accurate forecasts. On average, the result for all 
market participants gets worse. This process therefore shows the structure of 
an iterated n-person game with one dominant strategy, that produces a collec-
tively dissatisfying result: the typical structure of a prisoner’s dilemma.
55 
A more recent theroretical approach points into the same direction: noise in 
the process of price formation; attempts of investors to derive a benefit from 
it; the dominance of trend following strategies; generation of positive feed-
back; and a suboptimal result for all: These are typical features of financial 
systems as they have recently been modeled through analogies from physics 
and mathematical biology.
56 Such complex adaptive systems are characterized 
by the fact that they do not automatically head for an equilibrium, but tempo-
rarily become more imbalanced. Slight changes accumulate into complex in-
teractions which can cause the whole system to “collapse” – which results in 
the boom-crash-cycles that are so typical in the financial markets.
57 
In these models, particular attention is given to the role of the perceptions 
of market participants: The perceptions of market participants depend on the 
perceptions they expect from other market participants, who, on the other 
hand, take into account the perceptions of still other market participants: a 
self-referential and indeterminate, and above all, as Brian Arthur (1995) points 
out: an instable process.
58 The investors’ expectations depend on the supposed 
expectations of other investors, and their expectations again depend on expec-
tations they assume other investors to have.
59 In the Rorschach image of cha-
otic price information, a slight hint of a pattern is enough to set off a self-
reinforcing trend. Such hints are permanently provided by the professional 
pattern seekers from the mass media. 
 
6. Crash: Media and Market Panics 
The development and bursting of the internet bubble provides the most im-
pressive example so far for speculative excesses going along with the mediali-
zation of the markets. Stock price variance, trading turnovers, market capitali-
zation or permanent media presence: In practically every important category, 
internet companies established new records. At the end of the nineties, they 
made up close to 20 per cent of the volume of stocks traded each day – at a  




time when the sector as a whole incurred losses.
60 At one point in time, even 
the re-naming of companies which then somehow sounded like internet com-
panies evoked enormous price movements. Ofek and Richardson (2002) are 
therefore justified in speaking of “bizarre behavior of internet prices”. The in-
vestors definitely were too optimistic in their expectations for the future. 
Between 1998 and 2000, the internet sector generated a return of more than 
1,000 per cent
61 – a spectacular price increase that did not only seem to be 
fundamentally unsecured after the collapse of the stocks: A number of market 
observers already described the prices as unjustified during the euphoric boom 
period.
62 But why did an early price adjustment by sceptical actors not take 
place? Ofek and Richardson provide evidence indicating that the pessimists 
(who later turned out to be the realists) were “run over” by the optimists. Ac-
cording to the authors, private investors, among them many novices in the 
stock market, believed the internet “hype” and marched into the same direc-
tion in huge numbers. 
Without any doubt, several factors play an important role: a novel kind of 
technology, whose potential could not be clearly estimated; an inflation of fo-
recasts coming from many analysts, not least motivated by interconnections 
between investment banks and their clients; limited possibilities to sell securi-
ties short, the reason why pessimistic price assessments could not assert them-
selves; generally exaggerated expectations concerning long-term stock returns. 
But the media – finance newspapers, investor magazines and particularly news 
channels such as CNBC and n-tv – served as a multiplier: They spread the “vi-
rus” – the Internet story – globally, according to the overall sound of the cov-
erage, in a positive or even euphoric tone. The good news was disseminated 
rapidly – until it was taken up by the whole media system.
63 
The idea of the cyber-economy made for a strong storyline and caused 
plenty of attention. And it brought the media breathtaking accruals in advertis-
ing. As an empirically weak, but suggestive macro-story, the fiction of the di-
gital knowledge economy provided a projection screen for many effective mi-
cro-stories: from the emancipation of the individual due to mobile technology, 
to wealth for all in the stock exchange, or the revolution of economic activity 
via the internet. Small wonder that many investors yielded to the temptation: 
Obviously, the internet story was highly “infective” when it came across an  




appropriately pre-conditioned “carrier”. The media hype was the sine qua non 
of the boom and subsequent crash of the “new economy”. 
This does not imply that the price decline was a phenomenon of irrational 
novices jumping like lemmings over the cliff of the stock market. Schuster 
(2001) gives several examples proving that not only uninformed small inves-
tors followed the trend of the growth stocks.
64 To mention only one particular 
case: According to press reports, George Soros did not become strongly in-
volved in technology securities until 1999, shortly before the end of the boom, 
and therefore suffered heavy losses after the crash. Examples like this refute 
the popular opinion that the internet euphoria was solely the result of aberrant 
behavior of irrational private investors. The exaggerations were also brought 
about by big investors hoping to benefit from price increases – who stirred the 
euphoria even more.
65 
Ofek and Richardson (2002) pass a similar judgement: “[…] there is no 
doubt that very sophisticated investors, and highly regarded managers of com-
panies, invested considerable capital in the internet sector. These investments 
alone suggest that a story based on an influx of irrational, retail investors is 
probably too simplistic.”
66 Most signs suggest that the internet bubble was a 
textbook case of speculative mania: a dynamic process in which unusual price 
movements arouse investors’ attention and positive feedback leads to self-re-
inforcement. The media multiplied the stories which provided reasons for the 
enormous price fluctuations and animated investors to follow the trend. 
In his classic account of the history of market panics, economic historian 
Charles Kindleberger (1978) presents a model of such financial crises. Specu-
lative excesses, Kindleberger says, take place following a remarkably stable 
pattern: At first an event changes economic perspectives. Novel profit oppor-
tunities appear and are used by market participants. The chance turns into a 
boom: New investments lead to increases in income, which stimulate further 
investment. The boom leads to excess: Irrational motives dominate the behav-
ior of a growing number of investors, asset prices continue to go up.
67  
Until the market enters a manic phase: Now, euphoria and the desire to 
speculate become the guiding principles of investment decisions. The mass 
pursuit of returns results in a mass flight from reality. “A larger and larger  




group of people”, according to Kindleberger, “seeks to become rich without a 
real understanding of the processes involved.”
68 But at a certain point, some 
insiders opt out and take their profits. Tentatively at first, then more and more 
clearly, doubts arise as to the longevity of the profit scheme. When the realiza-
tion sets in that the market has exaggerated, a wave of retreat sets in. Disillu-
sionment turns into aversion, aversion results in panic.
69 
Robert Shiller (2000) supposes that the mass media have played a role in 
the generation of financial manias since their invention: “The history of specu-
lative bubbles begins roughly with the advent of newspapers. One can assume 
that, although the record of these early newspapers is mostly lost, they regu-
larly reported on the first bubble of any consequence, the Dutch tulip mania of 
the 1630s. Although the news media […] present themselves as detached ob-
servers of market events, they are themselves an integral part of these events. 
Significant market events generally occur only if there is similar thinking 
among large groups of people, and the news media are essential vehicles for 
the spread of ideas.”
70 And that is not all: The media also disseminate emoti-
ons – and reinforce them.
71 
They thus lay the groundwork for the appearance of speculative manias and 
market panics. They arouse investors’ interest and stir up their enthusiasm for 
the stock exchange. In boom times, they bring breathless stories about the up-
swing, which are followed by in no way less breathless stories about the com-
ing economic crisis. The pressure to sell the same material hour after hour 
leads to sensationalism and exaggerations, particularly in financial television. 
And to the overrating of individual topics: In the media spotlight, only few 
occurences are highlighted as news events. The effect is an amazing standardi-
zation of media contents. Public attention is narrowed as a consequence. A ho-
mogenous kind of mass behavior thus becomes highly probable. 
Two factors play an important role in the origin of financial euphoria, both 
of them are reinforced by the media: overrating future gains and the “envy ef-
fect”. Countless stock recommendations and stock price forecasts, the self-
confident air of finance commentators as well as the optimistic tone of the co-
verage easily convey the impression that profits can be programmed. Most of 
the time, past gains are projected into the future, a fact that encourages trend 
following behavior. Frequently, profit prospects are assumed which are at the  




at the upper limit of a realistic scale of expectations. Often, they go much fur-
ther. 
The envy factor is also increased by the media: Reports about easy money 
foster emulation. Kindleberger comments: “There is nothing so disturbing to 
one’s well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich.”
72 In times of peri-
odic stock market booms, it seems that the whole neighborhood is rolling in 
money. Hardly anybody talks about the losers at the markets. The supposed 
profits of others are an incentive to try one’s luck – and to follow the stimulus 
of the masses. Both factors, the overrating of future profits and the envy effect 
increase the probability of irrational behavior. This public pressure has be-
come tremendously heavier with the expansion of the business media. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
The expansion of the business media has caused a change in the dynamics of 
investor behavior. The density as well as the frequency of news have increased 
significantly. Global information channels have aroused the attention of many 
people, who become active in the markets in ever growing numbers. A lot of 
these novices receive their “basic training” in investment issues via the media, 
even via such an improbable candidate as television. „[…] television news“, 
Shanto Iyyengar and Donald Kinder (1987) write, „is in fact an educator vir-
tually without peer.“
73 The representations of the markets in the media do not 
only influence what people think about, but also how they do this.   
The influence of the news media increases the probability that trend follow-
ing behavior sets in among investors: They attract attention to short-term price 
changes and provide explanations which afterwards evoke an impression of 
logic – logic that meets the demand of the media for conclusive stories. Ran-
dom or chaotic price movements are “explained away” systematically. Under 
the impression of such stylized stories, investors tend to update developments 
of the past and to extrapolate trends. The strong selectivity of the media, in-
creasing with growing competitive pressure, supports a homogenization of the 
contents. This provides the basis for the tendency that the behavior of increas-
ing numbers of investors condenses into few alternatives.  




The media can thus generate positive feedback in the market: they focus at-
tention on current price changes and reinforce the latent tendency of investors 
to project them into the future – and provoke overreactions in doing so. This is 
how price fluctuations can reinforce themselves: The media focus public at-
tention on some particularly striking price movements, which are then further 
increased by the reactions of the public. Only small numbers of noise traders 
are necessary for such a feedback process to occur: In anticipation of media-
induced feedback, the incentive is high enough even for informed investors to 
implement a trend-following strategy – and in this way contribute to the reali-
zation of the price movements that have been forecast. 
The selective awareness of investors and the selective awareness of the 
media reinforce each other and favor mutual overreactions. Good news lead to 
increased optimism and serve as an incentive to buy more. Good prices, in re-
turn, lead to good news, which tend to favor good prices. Price increases are 
followed by buy recommendations, and vice versa. The positive market trend 
and the positive media trend mutually reinforce each other, the prevailing op-
timism results in expectations for the future painted in the most glowing col-
ors. The emergence of stock market euphoria is thereby encouraged. This pro-
cess is dynamic, it is self-referential and above all: it is inherently unstable.  
These dynamic interactions necessarily reach a point of culmination, when 
the market trend and the opinion trend decouple: The media continue to pur-
sue their strategy of optimism, but the prices deviate from their highs. Ini-
tially, this divergence is often very small: The market lives on contradictory 
signals, that fit various patterns of interpretation and can often be read in a 
positive as well as in a negative way. The market emits increasingly ambigu-
ous signals, which the media, however, tend to interpret in an unambiguous 
way. If the contradiction becomes too obvious, a change of tone occurs: The 
constant optimism is followed by scepticism and then, step by step, turns into 
negativism. 
Bad news only reinforce the upcoming pessimism and are used as an op-
portunity for more and more sales. Bad prices then cause bad news in return, 
which tend to favor bad prices. The negative market trend and the negative 
media trend mutually reinforce each other, the prevailing pessimism results in 
overly gloomy expectations for the future. The resulting chain reactions foster  




the generation of panic under certain circumstances. Until market trends and 
media trends are decoupled again – and the cycle of panic and euphoria starts 
all over again. 
The picture that emerges is thus very complex: Market participants stand in 
a reflexive relationship, since their decisions are mutually interdependent. The 
expected reactions of others are taken into account, and their anticipation can 
result in a self-reinforcement of these reactions. Dynamic disequilibria are a 
real possibility if perceptions and price movements mutually reinforce each 
other. The effect can be a change in the fundamental values, which has reper-
cussions on perceptions and prices. The media act as a catalyst of these dy-
namic processes because they contribute to the structuring and coordination of 
decision making processes and thereby accelerate and intensify feedback ef-
fects. They thus constitute a possibly destabilizing element, since they support 
the continuation and reinforcement of states of disequilibrium, or maybe even 
trigger them. 
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64 Schuster (20001), 67f.  
65 Cf. "‚Macro’ Investors Era May Be Over: Soros Out of the Game." In: National 
Post, 06/27/2000. Soros is of the opinion that it can be a successful speculative stra-
tegy to imitate noise traders (or better: to be ahead of them) and not to build up a 
counterposition until shortly before the trend reversal. Cf. Soros (1987) as well as 
Shleifer and Summers (1990), 28. 
66 Barber and Odean (2002) provide evidence showing that private investors are par-
ticularly strongly influenced by conspicuous news in their investment decisions. In-
stitutional investors are less susceptible in this regard. This leads to the conclusion 
that systematic price movements are more often provoked by the former. Ofek and 
Richardson (2001) argue accordingly for the case of the internet bubble. The econo-
mist Paul Krugman, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the herd instinct is more 
pronounced among professional fund managers than among private investors. Per-
sonal communication,  01/19/2001 and Krugman (1997).  





67 Also cf. Galbraith (1954). For the counterposition, which seriously questions the 
existence of price bubbles cf. Garber (1989 and 2001). For the current discussion 
about speculative mania in the financial markets, its effects on the real economy and 
possible political counter-measures cf. Hunter, Kaufman and Pomerleano (2003). 
68 Kindleberger (1978), 16. 
69 Galbraith (1954) describes the bursting of a bubble as follows: At first, the bubble 
is defended by those who profit from it, critics are ignored or discredited. Then, the 
programmed collapse takes its course: Business outlooks and price forecasts are sys-
tematically missed. Many promises, especially those dating from the phase of eupho-
ria, turn out to be lies. Many people lose their money, financial devastation is the 
consequence. But the shock is only short-lived, the markets have no memory. The 
reasons for the crash are not discussed, the disaster quickly sinks into oblivion. And 
speculation starts all over again.  
70 Shiller (2000), 71. 
71 The biologist Richard Dawkins (1976) developed a concept of self-replicating  
ideas which he calls "memes" in his book The Selfish Gene. According to Dawkins, 
"memes" lead a life of their own, they spread like a virus and sometimes cause mass 
infections. Memes are passed on from one person to the next through imitation. This 
theory of thought infections, which are also and particularly spread by the media, 
gave cause to the assumption that memetic infections play a role in the financial 
markets. This theory is somewhat tautological and should probably only be consid-
ered as a graphic metaphor. As such, however, it is quite interesting heuristically, 
since it focusses attention on processes of mass dissemination of irrational ideas and 
ways of behavior, such as mass hysteria and panic. Cf. Dawkins (1976 and 1999); 
Frank (1999); Lynch (1996). 
72 Kindleberger (1978), 15. 
73 Iyengar and Kinder (1987), 2. 
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